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ABSTRACT—An international, multidisciplinary effort aims
to identify evidence-based treatments (EBTs) or interven-
tions. The goal of this effort is to identify specific techniques
or programs that successfully target and change specific
behaviors. In clinical psychology, EBTs are identified
based on the outcomes of randomized controlled trials
examining whether treatments outperform control or al-
ternative treatment conditions. Treatment outcomes are
measured in multiple ways. Consistently, different ways of
gauging outcomes yield inconsistent conclusions. Histori-
cally, EBT research has not accounted for these inconsis-
tencies. In this paper we highlight the implications of
inconsistencies, describe a framework for redressing in-
consistent findings, and illustrate how the framework can
guide future research on how to administer and combine
treatments to maximize treatment effects and how to study
treatments via quantitative review.
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Movements toward identifying evidence-based treatments
(EBTs) or interventions encompass multiple disciplines, in-
cluding dentistry, education, medicine, nursing, psychology, and
social work. Scientists in each area conduct research to identify
specific interventions, therapies, or programs that successfully
target and change specific problem domains or behaviors (e.g.,
academic achievement, mood, delinquency, hypertension).
Within psychology—particularly clinical, counseling, educa-
tional, and school psychology—several EBTs have been iden-
tified. Different professional groups, organizations, and task
forces, as well as groups in different countries (e.g., within the
European Union), states, provinces, and territories (e.g., within
the United States and Canada) have developed systems delin-
eating specific criteria for identifying EBTs. A key criterion is
that the treatment outperforms a no-treatment or alternative-
treatment group in randomized controlled trials. This paper
elaborates on this criterion, highlights critical interpretive
problems that apply to treatment research, and describes a way
to redress these problems. We raise these issues within evi-
dence-based psychotherapy specifically, but the points apply to
evidence-based intervention research more generally.
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE EVIDENCE
Controlled trials use multiple outcome measures of a given
construct and assessments of multiple constructs—sound
scientific practices when defining a construct. This strategy
has heightened significance for research on identifying EBTs,
because a single measure rarely captures the constructs of
interest: Patient outcomes and the range of domains reflecting
dysfunction or well-being (e.g., positive changes in maladjust-
ment, anxiety, impairment, mood). Thus, a single study includes
multiple measures of both the same construct (e.g., depression)
and related constructs (e.g., anxiety, impairment). These mul-
tiple measures vary in terms of the information source (e.g.,
relatives, teachers, clinicians), as well as in terms of the ways
measurements are taken (e.g., symptom counts, disorder diag-
noses) and examined statistically. Researchers rarely hypothe-
size whether some measures and not others will support the
treatment. Often, it appears that researchers expect all measures
to suggest the treatment is effective.
What if the measures do not all lead to the same conclusion?
If, for example, ten measures are used, how many of these
measures should support the treatment? Should two of ten
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measures support it, or five of ten, or eight of ten? Currently,
treatment research does not readily address these questions.
This is a critical issue in EBT research, because inconsistencies
often arise across assessments of adults and youths and across
the many constructs treated in the clinical sciences (e.g., de-
pression, aggression, parenting; Achenbach, 2006; De Los
Reyes & Kazdin, 2005, 2006). Multiple measures are necessary
and each provides reliable and valid information; it is not the
case that some are ‘‘right’’ and others ‘‘wrong.’’ Yet, they often
lead to inconsistent conclusions.
Within studies, only some measures show that the treatment
and control conditions are statistically different (e.g., De Los
Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; Flannery-Schroeder & Kendall, 2000;
Webster-Stratton & Hammond, 1997). Often, researchers focus
on supportive measures and do not discuss the other measures or
merely note that they did not ‘‘come out.’’ Further, between two or
more studies of the same treatment, measures that support and
do not support the treatment in one study do not necessarily lead
to the same conclusions in other studies (e.g., Barrett, Dadds, &
Rapee, 1996; Kendall, 1994; Kendall et al., 1997). Therefore, at
the end of controlled trials, conclusions can range from stating
that the treatment is evidence-based to stating that it is not
evidence-based, or to stating that the evidence is mixed and
dependant on the measure relied on to define treatment out-
comes (De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006).
There has been insufficient recognition of inconsistent evi-
dence, and no model exists to integrate inconsistencies that
accounts for all of the evidence. It is possible to acknowledge
inconsistencies and still use the evidence to identify EBTs. In-
deed, inconsistent findings might signify important circum-
stances in which evidence suggests treatments are effective and
circumstances in which evidence is inconclusive. For instance,
consistent findings based on informants that observe behavior in
one context (e.g., a mother observing her child at home), and
inconsistent findings based on other informants that observe be-
havior in another context (e.g., a teacher observing that same child
at school) may suggest where an intervention may yield particu-
larly robust outcomes (home-based rather than school-based
behavior). One way of addressing inconsistencies in the identifi-
cation of EBTs is to devise a plan for identifying patterns in evi-
dence that reveal the ways in which treatments are most effective.
THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE CHANGES MODEL
The Range of Possible Changes (RPC) Model was designed to
consider within- and between-study consistencies to identify
EBTs. By ‘‘range,’’ we mean the myriad conclusions that might
be drawn from multiple findings that are discrepant in their
support (or lack thereof) of a particular treatment’s effects. This
includes treatment literatures that often employ a single mea-
sure or source to gauge treatment effects (e.g., smoking cessa-
tion, weight loss). Indeed, in these treatment literatures, the
methods by which outcomes are quantified are often arbitrary
(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006), suggesting that even single outcomes
can and ought to be examined in multiple ways.
The model provides a classification system that identifies
EBTs based in part on whether multiple or specific outcome
methods consistently yield similar conclusions. Within this
system are categories that classify the many different kinds of
studies that produce evidence for treatments (Table 1). Broadly,
the categories span classifications of studies that find consistent
evidence across multiple ways of gauging outcomes (e.g., Best
Evidence for Change), consistent evidence when employing
specific outcome methods (e.g., Evidence for Measure- or
Method-Specific Change), and inconsistent evidence (e.g.,
Limited Evidence for Change; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006).
Further, the categories can be applied to classifying evidence,
depending on what is targeted for treatment. In other words, one
can classify evidence based on multiple measures that represent
the same outcome domain (e.g., multiple symptom reduction
measures, multiple risk factor measures). Most critically, the
RPC Model can be used to examine whether two studies of
the same treatment yield consistent evidence between them. An
example would be two studies examining whether a particular
treatment reduces symptoms of anxiety. If the studies could both
be classified within the same category (e.g., Best Evidence for
Change), then they may be classified as providing consistent
evidence for the reduction of anxiety symptoms.
In addition, the model acknowledges that outcomes might be
tested in multiple ways. Specifically, outcomes are often evalu-
ated by examining statistical differences between treatment and
control conditions, yielding a limited set of possible findings
(e.g., treatment is effective, evidence is inconclusive, treatment
makes people worse). Indeed, the classification categories de-
scribed in Table 1 are based on this method. However, another
method assesses how much of a difference exists between con-
ditions (e.g., effect size, or the degree of difference between the
average scores of treatment and control participants). Combin-
ing these two methods might reveal nuances in a treatment’s
effectiveness. For example, a study’s evidence might meet cri-
teria for the Best Evidence for Change category (Table 1) and yet
have observed magnitudes of change ranging from small to large.
Thus, the RPC Model addresses the issue of multiple methods of
testing outcomes by incorporating treatment outcomes classifi-
cations based on categorical statistical differences with evalu-
ations of the range of outcomes based on degree of statistical
differences (for a discussion of measurement reliability and
statistical power issues see De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006).
ADVANCES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Prior research has identified EBTs and yet has not accounted for
inconsistent findings. However, inconsistencies may reveal im-
portant information of treatment effects: They may highlight both
the variety of ways that a treatment may change behaviors and
the specific circumstances in which a treatment may be effective
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(Table 1). The RPC Model addresses inconsistencies and reveals
directions for future research that could lead to a greater un-
derstanding of how to administer and combine treatments to
maximize their effects and how to conduct meta-analytic reviews
of treatment research.
First, the RPC Model identifies the circumstances in which
treatments might produce consistent effects. For instance,
consider a treatment that the evidence suggests produces robust
effects within specific circumstances (e.g., symptom reduction,
at school or with peers) and inconsistent effects within other
circumstances (e.g., diagnostic remission, at home). With this
evidence, researchers have an increased understanding of how
to administer that treatment in future studies (e.g., where effects
were consistently observed). Further, researchers have a greater
understanding of how long that treatment ought to be adminis-
tered (e.g., enough to produce symptom reductions, longer to
produce both symptom reductions and diagnostic remission).
Therefore, the RPC Model guides knowledge of treatment ef-
fects, leading to sensible decision making as to where and how to
administer treatments.
Second, the RPC Model identifies two potentially fruitful
methods for combining treatments. Broadly, one might concep-
tualize combining treatments such that each treatment produces
consistent effects that the other treatment does not produce. This
strategy is like fitting two puzzle pieces together, where each
piece fills in the gaps left open by the other piece. Specifically,
one strategy might involve combining two or more treatments
that are identified as producing consistent effects in different
domains of the same construct. An example might be a combined
protocol including a treatment that both consistently produces
effects on symptom outcome measures and inconsistently pro-
duces effects on risk-factor outcome measures with another
treatment that consistently produces effects on risk-factor out-
come measures and not on symptom outcome measures.
Another method might involve two or more treatments that are
identified as producing consistent effects in different contexts or
circumstances within the same domain (Table 1). For instance,
one might combine a treatment that produces consistent symp-
tom reductions on school-based and not home-based measures
with a treatment that produces consistent symptom reductions
on home-based and not school-based measures. Therefore, the
RPC Model guides the development of cost-effective methods of
combining treatments so that effects are not redundant between
treatments in a combined protocol.
Third, the RPC Model informs future meta-analytic reviews of
treatment research. Indeed, traditional meta-analytic reviews
TABLE 1
Description and Criteria of Range of Possible Changes (RPC) Model Categories
Category Criteria
Best Evidence for Change At least 80% of the findings from three or more informants, measures, and analytic methods show differences,
and at least three findings were gleaned from each of the informants, measures, and methods. There is no
clear informant-specific, measure-specific, or method-specific pattern of findings. The evidence suggests the
intervention successfully targets the construct.
Evidence for Probable Change More than 50% of the findings from three or more informants, measures, and analytic methods show
differences, and at least three findings were gleaned from each of the informants, measures, and methods.
There is no clear informant-specific, measure-specific, or method-specific pattern of findings. The evidence
suggests the intervention probably changes the targeted outcome domain, yet future work ought to examine
why inconsistencies occurred.
Limited Evidence for Change Either 50% or less of the findings from three or more informants, measures, and analytic methods show
differences, or less than the grand majority (less than 80%) of findings from specific informant’s ratings,
measures, and/or methods show differences. Any differences found are either scattered across outcomes from
multiple informants, measures, or methods, or are not found predominantly on outcomes from specific
informants, measures, and/or methods. The evidence is inconclusive.
No Evidence for Change No differences are observed. The evidence is completely inconclusive.
Evidence for Informant-
Specific Change
Differences are found on the grand majority (80%) of ratings provided by specific informant(s), and at least
three findings were gleaned from the informant(s) for which specificity of findings were observed. The
evidence suggests the treatment might change the domain when it is exhibited in specific situations or in
interactions with specific informant(s).
Evidence for Measure- or
Method-Specific Change
Differences are found on the grand majority (80%) of specific measure(s) or analytic method(s), and at least
three findings were gleaned from the measure(s) or method(s) for which specificity of findings were observed.
The evidence suggests the intervention might change the domain when it is measured with specific kinds of
measure(s), method(s), or both.
Note. Adapted from De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006. By ‘‘informants’’ we mean reporters of outcomes (e.g., self, spouse or significant other, clinician, laboratory
observer, biological, institutional records); by ‘‘measures’’ we mean ways to assess outcomes (e.g., questionnaire or symptom-count measures, laboratory
observations, diagnostic interviews); by ‘‘analytic methods’’ we mean statistical strategies (e.g., tests of mean differences, tests of diagnostic status).
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have identified effects of specific treatment techniques by
averaging effects multiple times—not only within studies but
also between studies of the same or similar techniques (e.g.,
Matt, 1989; Stice & Shaw, 2004). However, with average
treatment effects, it remains unclear whether consistent evi-
dence is found within any one study or between any two studies.
For instance, a sample of treatment studies might on average
yield large treatment effects. Yet, that sample might include
multiple studies that only yielded statistically significant effects
on half of their outcome measures, with no two studies yielding
the same ranges of magnitudes of effects (e.g., no two studies
suggesting effects ranged from medium to large). Further, even
procedures that statistically correct for potentially biasing fac-
tors in effect-size estimates (differences in integrity of admin-
istration of treatment, differences in reliability of measures;
Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) still often apply these corrections at
an aggregate level (e.g., across outcomes within a study or
across averages of outcomes within an entire study sample).
Aggregate measures and their corrections do not necessarily
yield evidence on whether individual measures within and
between studies are replicating the same effect or consistently
suffering from the same biasing factors (De Los Reyes & Kazdin,
2006).
The RPC Model might be used to study evidence via meta-
analysis, by employing both categorical (Table 1) and continuous
(effect-size) measures of treatment effects. For example, within a
sample of studies of the same treatment, one could both classify
each study categorically using the RPC Model categories and
calculate effect sizes for each outcome to determine the range of
effects observed for each study (i.e., highest and lowest effect
sizes). With this critical information, one can address a number
of pertinent research questions. For example, one can examine
whether multiple studies are both consistently classified in the
same RPC Model category and show similar ranges of treatment
effects (e.g., two or more studies classified in the Evidence for
Probable Change category, exhibiting medium-to-large treat-
ment effects). Further, one could examine moderators of both
RPC Model categorical classifications and moderators of the
upper and lower limit effects observed within each study. For
instance, one could study whether sample (gender, age), treat-
ment (individual vs. group), and methodological (reliability of
measures) characteristics are related to the likelihood that a
study would be classified in a particular RPC Model category or
related to the average range or distance between the highest and
lowest effect sizes observed within studies. Additionally, the
framework’s use of effect-size measures makes it possible to
use versions of statistical correction procedures to account for
differences among studies in treatments examined and differ-
ences among outcome measures in their reliability or other
measurement properties (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Thus, one can
study treatments meta-analytically and still account for important
information on the consistency in treatment effects, as well as
identify moderators of within- and between-study consistency.
CONCLUSIONS
The movement toward identifying EBTs advances a research
literature that spans multiple disciplines and types of inter-
ventions in mental health, physical health, and education. Our
aim in this article is to enhance the already remarkable gains
made in EBT research and the broader EBT movement. In the
practice of clinical psychology, non-EBTs for adults and youths
continue to be used when EBTs that target the same behaviors
are available. Although a given study might reveal inconsistent
outcomes—and this raises significant issues—this ought to be
presented in the context of a key reality: Hundreds of ‘‘evidence-
less’’ treatments are being administered to patients (Kazdin,
2000), and some evidence, although inconsistent, is clearly
better than none. We do not advocate non-EBTs where EBTs are
available.
A critical interpretive issue requires further attention: In a
given study and across studies that replicate that original study,
some measures show a change and others do not. This reality
applies to treatments for both adults and youths and encom-
passes the range of behaviors targeted in research. There has
been tacit selection of the measures that show change. In part,
this selection is driven by basic-science issues, in that ‘‘null
and negative effects’’ are difficult to interpret and can arise for
myriad reasons (e.g., low statistical power or small sample
size, poor measure reliability). However, statistically significant
and positive effects might also be difficult to interpret and can
arise for multiple reasons. Null effects can be real (i.e., reflect
that no change occurred), just as much as significant changes
on measures could be attributable to chance fluctuations in
outcomes.
The RPC Model takes into account inconsistencies, and em-
ploying the framework will allow researchers to draw reliable
and valid conclusions amidst them. Further, the RPC Model
yields interesting directions for future research on understand-
ing intervention effects and how to maximize them. We encour-
age future research that uses the RPC Model to evaluate (a) the
circumstances in which interventions produce the most con-
sistent effects, (b) ways of combining interventions, and (c) in-
tervention effects via meta-analytic review. More than a single
model, we encourage further work on the matter of inconsis-
tencies and how they ought to be integrated to draw conclusions
from EBT research.
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